How to make a carbon tax reform progressive: The role of subsistence consumption by Klenert, David & Mattauch, Linus
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
How to make a carbon tax reform
progressive: The role of subsistence
consumption
David Klenert and Linus Mattauch
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), Mercator
Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change
(MCC), Technical University of Berlin
3 August 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84291/
MPRA Paper No. 84291, posted 3 February 2018 14:33 UTC
How to make a carbon tax reform progressive:
The role of subsistence consumption∗
David Klenert†, Linus Mattauch‡
Abstract
This letter analyzes the distributional effects of a carbon tax re-
form when households must consume carbon-intensive goods above a
subsistence level. The reform is progressive if revenues are recycled as
uniform lump-sum transfers, in other cases it is regressive.
JEL classification: D30, D60, E62, H22, H23
Keywords: Carbon tax reform, distribution, revenue recycling, inequality,
non-homothetic preferences
∗Published in Economics Letters, 138, 100-103, (available from Elsevier through
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.11.019)
†Corresponding author. Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate
Change (MCC), Torgauer Str. 12-15, D-10829 Berlin, Germany. Technical University
of Berlin, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), Email: klenert@mcc-
berlin.net, Phone: +49-(0)30-3385-537-253.
‡Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC), Techni-
cal University of Berlin, Email: mattauch@mcc-berlin.net
1
1 Introduction
Mitigating climate change requires substantial reductions in carbon emis-
sions, which can be achieved most cost-effectively by carbon pricing (Tie-
tenberg, 1990). An important obstacle to introducing carbon pricing are
distributional concerns: Pricing emissions in developed countries is often
believed to harm the poorest part of the population due to the higher share
of their income these households spend on carbon-intensive goods (Grainger
and Kolstad, 2010; Fullerton, 2011; Combet et al., 2010).
Grainger and Kolstad (2010) show, for the case of the US, that there is
a subsistence level for most carbon-intensive goods and that a price increase
in these goods is the main driver behind the regressivity of carbon taxes.
This mechanism, has received scarce attention in the theoretical literature
on the distributional implications of carbon tax reforms.
Analyzing the distributional effects of a carbon tax reform while ac-
counting for a subsistence level of carbon-intensive goods is the purpose
of the present note. We use a stylized analytical model that features two
consumption goods, one of which is assumed to be carbon-intensive. House-
holds differ only in their productivity and must consume a minimal amount
of the carbon-intensive good to survive. We are only concerned with the
short-term distributional effects of a carbon tax reform, i.e. how setting
a price on carbon impacts inequality1, which we believe to be decisive for
political decision making.
We find three main results. First, when the tax revenue is returned to the
households via linear income tax cuts, or in proportion to their productivity,
the overall effect of the tax reform is regressive. Second, for the case of uni-
form lump-sum recycling, the overall effect of the tax reform is progressive.
Finally, we show that when setting the subsistence level of carbon-intensive
consumption to zero, regressive policies appear to be distribution-neutral.
Previous literature either relies on large numerical models (Rausch et al.,
2010, 2011) or on rather specific modeling assumptions (Fullerton and Monti,
2013; Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha, 2014).2 In fact, there seems to be
some disagreement in the theoretical literature on the extent to which the
regressivity of a carbon tax can be reduced by the recycling of its revenues:
Fullerton and Monti (2013) show that in a model with household hetero-
geneity in skills, “returning all of the revenue to low-skilled workers is still
not enough to offset higher product prices.” (p. 539) On the other hand,
Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha (2014) demonstrate that an environmental
1This permits us to abstract from major factors usually discussed in the context of
climate policy, such as environmental damages and structural change.
2A parallel strand of literature studies the interplay of carbon and income taxes in
optimal taxation frameworks (Cremer et al., 1998; Jacobs and De Mooij, 2015; Klenert
et al., 2016). Optimal carbon tax reforms under equity constraints are analyzed by Kaplow
(2012).
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tax can always be designed to be Pareto-improving if the revenue is used for
a progressive reform of the wage tax. They use a model in which pollution
is a by-product of capital and hence interpret a capital tax as an environ-
mental tax. Households differ in skill level and age. Both studies mention a
subsistence level of polluting consumption as at least partially responsible
for the regressivity of a carbon tax, but refrain from modeling it by means
of non-homothetic preferences.
A large body of literature confirms that low income households spend a
larger percentage of their income on carbon-intensive goods than high in-
come households, notably on heating, electricity and food (see e.g. Grainger
and Kolstad 2010; Flues and Thomas 2015 and Wier et al. 2001).3 In the
following we analyze the distributional impacts of a carbon tax reform when
this mechanism is modeled explicitly.
2 The model
We use a two-sector model in which N households are distinguished by
their productivity. Households need to consume a minimum amount of
the polluting good. Since we only consider the short term (i.e. structural
change is negligible), we use a static model. Furthermore we assume that
commodity prices are fixed. Sources-side effects, which are likely to be
progressive (Dissou and Siddiqui, 2014), are hence ignored and all the tax
burden is assumed to rest on the consumers.4
Households: The households are distinguished only by their producti-
vity φi, i = 1 . . . N . Each household is endowed with one unit of a production
factor. A share li of the production factor is used at home and can be inter-
preted as leisure. For the remaining share (1− li), the household receives a
rental rate w, so the households’ incomes Ii are given by
Ii = φiw(1− li)(1− τ0w + τw). (1)
Here τ0w denotes the income tax before the carbon tax reform and τw is a
potential (linear) income tax reduction financed by carbon tax revenues. We
normalize the household productivities so that
∑N
i=1 φi = 1.
Households derive utility from the consumption of clean goods Ci, pollu-
ting goods Di and leisure li. They have identical non-homothetic preferences
(due to the minimum-consumption requirement D0 for the polluting com-
modity) and maximize utility, given by
U(Ci, Di, li) = C
α
i (Di −D0)βlγi , (2)
3This might not be the case for developing countries, see Sterner (2011).
4For a study that also includes sources-side effects, see our more extensive numerical
analysis (Klenert et al., 2016). However, accounting for potentially progressive effects of
endogenous prices below would likely make our result from Proposition 2 stronger, while
the effect on the result from Proposition 1 is unclear.
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with α, β, γ > 0. We assume that α + β + γ = 1 to obtain more tractable
formulas, but our findings also hold for α+ β + γ 6= 1. The utility function
is not defined for Di < D0. The budget equation is given by
Ci · pC +Di · pD · (1 + τ) = Ii + Li, (3)
with τ denoting a tax on the polluting commodity and Li a lump-sum trans-
fer. We assume constant commodity prices.
Maximizing utility (2) subject to the budget constraint (3) yields the
first-order conditions of the households, which can be transformed to obtain
explicit expressions for Ci, Di and li:
Ci =
α
pC
(
φiw(1− τ0w + τw) + Li −D0pD(1 + τ)
)
, (4)
Di =
β
pD(1 + τ)
(
φiw(1− τ0w + τw) + Li −D0pD(1 + τ)
)
+D0, (5)
li =
γ
φiw(1− τ0w + τw)
(
φiw(1− τ0w + τw) + Li −D0pD(1 + τ)
)
. (6)
Government: The (non-optimizing) government has a fixed spending
requirement G, which is financed by the (pre-existing) income tax τ0w. Addi-
tional revenue can either be returned to the households via lump-sum trans-
fers Li or via reductions in the income tax τw. The government’s budget
constraint thus reads:
G+
N∑
i=1
Li +
N∑
i=1
φiw(1− li)τw = τ ·D · pD +
N∑
i=1
φiw(1− li)τ0w. (7)
3 Results
We analyze the distributional implications of three carbon tax reforms. Each
reform consists of a carbon tax combined with a revenue recycling-scheme.
We consider recycling through (i) lump-sum transfers in proportion to hou-
sehold productivities, (ii) linear income tax reductions and (iii) uniform
lump-sum transfers.
We show in Proposition 1 that in the first and second case, inequality in-
creases. In the third case, inequality is reduced (Proposition 2). Finally, we
demonstrate in Proposition 3 that recycling the revenues as in the first and
second case is distribution-neutral when the subsistence level of polluting
consumption equals zero.
We consider the utility ratio of two households as a measure of the dis-
tributional impacts of the carbon tax reform, since analyzing the income
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ratios would not capture the necessity of consuming at least an amount D0
of the polluting commodity. We verified numerically that our findings also
hold when the Gini coefficient in utility is used as a measure of inequality.5
The ratio of the indirect utilities of households i and j is:
Ui
Uj
=
Cαi (Di −D0)βlγi
Cαj (Dj −D0)βlγj
=
(
φj
φi
)γ ( (φiw(1− τ0w + τw) + Li −D0pD(1 + τ))
(φjw(1− τ0w + τw) + Lj −D0pD(1 + τ))
)
We denote by (Ui/Uj)
BT the ratio of utilities before taxes, (Ui/Uj)
AT-P
the case of a tax with the revenues recycled in proportion to each household’s
productivity φi, (Ui/Uj)
AT-T the case of a tax with the revenues recycled
via linear income tax reductions and (Ui/Uj)
AT-U the ratio of utilities after
taxes with uniform lump-sum recycling of the revenues:(
Ui
Uj
)BT
=
(
φj
φi
)γ (φiw(1− τ0w)−D0pD
φjw(1− τ0w)−D0pD
)
, (8)
(
Ui
Uj
)AT-P
=
(
φj
φi
)γ (φi(w(1− τ0w) + τpDD)−D0pD(1 + τ)
φj(w(1− τ0w) + τpDD)−D0pD(1 + τ)
)
, (9)
(
Ui
Uj
)AT-T
=
(
φj
φi
)γ (φiw(1− τ0w + τw)−D0pD(1 + τ)
φjw(1− τ0w + τw)−D0pD(1 + τ)
)
, (10)
(
Ui
Uj
)AT-U
=
(
φj
φi
)γ (φiw(1− τ0w) + τDpD 1N −D0pD(1 + τ)
φjw(1− τ0w) + τDpD 1N −D0pD(1 + τ)
)
. (11)
Proposition 1. The incidence of a tax on the polluting good is regressive
if the revenues are recycled
(a) in proportion to each household’s productivity φi (i.e. Li = φiτpDD and
τw = 0).
(b) via linear income tax cuts τw (i.e. τww
∑N
i=1 φi(1 − li) = τpDD and
Li = 0).
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5These results are available upon request.
6Some argue that using carbon tax revenues for rebates in a pre-existing income tax
system does not only reduce pollution but also enhances efficiency (Goulder, 1995; Boven-
berg, 1999). Proposition 1 (b) implies that reaping such an additional benefit might come
at the cost of increased inequality (at least if the tax cut is linear).
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The before-taxes utility ratio given in Equation (8) is proportional to
the sum of a utility-increasing (φkw(1 − τ0w)) and a utility-reducing term
(−D0pD) with k = i, divided by the same sum with k = j. In the proof
we show that recycling the carbon revenue as in Equations (9) and (10)
increases the utility-reducing term more strongly than the utility-increasing
term, which makes the policy regressive.
Proof. For the proof of part (a), it suffices to demonstrate that (Ui/Uj)
AT-P <
(Ui/Uj)
BT for φj > φi.
By introducing the auxiliary variables A and B we transform Equation
(9) into (
Ui
Uj
)AT-P
=
(
φj
φi
)γ (φiA(1 + BA )−D0pD(1 + τ)
φjA(1 +
B
A )−D0pD(1 + τ)
)
, (12)
with A = w(1− τ0w) and B = τpDD.
Similarly (Ui/Uj)
BT can be transformed:(
Ui
Uj
)BT
=
(
φj
φi
)γ (φiA−D0pD
φjA−D0pD
)
.
We can ignore the constant term (φj/φi)
γ which appears in both utility ra-
tios. It hence suffices to work with the second term. In both the numerator
and the denominator of Equation (12), a positive and a negative term re-
main. The positive term increases in B/A, which increases the utility ratio
(and thus decreases inequality). Similarly, the negative term (−D0pD) in-
creases in τ , which decreases the utility ratio (and thus increases inequality).
We can infer from this expression directly that the distributional effect of a
carbon tax reform is neutral if B/A = τ , since in that case the term (1 + τ)
can be eliminated from the fraction and we get (Ui/Uj)
AT-P = (Ui/Uj)
BT.
The distributional effect of a tax reform is regressive if B/A < τ and vice
versa. It thus remains to show that B/A < τ . By inserting the expressions
for A and B, we get
B
A
=
τpDD
w(1− τ0w)
< τ.
By rearranging, we obtain:
pDD < w(1− τ0w).
The term on left-hand side of this inequality represents total spending on
polluting goods (before the tax reform), the term on the right-hand side
stands for total income when aggregate leisure is zero (before the tax reform).
Since by assumption φi is strictly smaller than φj , households with j > 1
always consume positive amounts of leisure and of the clean good. Total
spending on polluting goods hence must be lower than total income (when
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no leisure is consumed) and the inequality above holds. This implies that
(Ui/Uj)
AT-P < (Ui/Uj)
BT, and closes the proof of part (a).
The proof of part (b) is analogous to that of part (a), using B = wτw
instead. What remains to show is that B/A < τ . By inserting the expressi-
ons for A and B we get:
B
A
=
τw
(1− τ0w)
< τ. (13)
For revenue recycling through income tax cuts, the sum of all income tax
rebates equals the total carbon tax revenue: τww
∑N
i=1 φi(1 − li) = τpDD.
We use this relationship to eliminate τw from Equation (13) and obtain:
B
A
=
τpDD
(1− τ0w)w
∑N
i=1 φi(1− li)
< τ.
By rearranging, we get:
pDD < (1− τ0w)w
N∑
i=1
φi(1− li).
The term on the left-hand side of this inequality stands for total spending
on polluting goods (before the tax reform), the term on the right-hand side
for total income (before the tax reform). For the same reason as in the proof
of part (a), this inequality holds.
Proposition 2. The tax reform is progressive for uniform lump-sum redis-
tribution of the revenues (that is Li = L = τpDD/N for i = 1, . . . , N and
τw = 0).
The intuition behind the subsequent proof is similar to the intuition
behind the proof of Proposition 1: in the case of a carbon tax with uniform
lump-sum recycling, a positive (utility-enhancing) and a negative (utility-
reducing) term are added to the numerator and the denominator of the
before-taxes utility ratio (Ui/Uj)
BT. Since the transfers are uniform, these
terms are constant across households. We demonstrate that the sum of both
terms is positive, which reduces inequality.
Proof. Two terms are added to both the numerator and the denominator
of the before-taxes utility ratio (Ui/Uj)
BT to obtain the after-taxes utility
ratio (Ui/Uj)
AT-U: −D0pDτ < 0 stands for a decrease in utility due to the
tax on subsistence consumption and τpDD/N > 0 stands for an increase in
utility due to the revenue recycling. Adding up these two terms yields:
τpDD/N −D0pDτ = pDτ(D/N −D0) > 0.
This expression is strictly bigger than zero since we assume that τ , pD > 0
and φi < φj . Therefore all agents with j > 1 have a level of polluting
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consumption that is higher than the subsistence level D0, so the average
level of polluting consumption, D/N , is always higher than the subsistence
level D0. The proof is then completed by using the elementary relation
m < s⇒ m
s
<
m+ t
s+ t
, for t > 0 and m, s > 0,
with m = φiw(1− τ0w)−D0pD, s = φjw(1− τ0w)−D0pD and t = −D0pDτ +
τDpD/N .
Proposition 3. For a subsistence level of polluting consumption of zero
(D0 = 0), the revenue-recycling mechanisms examined in Proposition 1 are
distribution-neutral.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that it is only our assumption of a subsis-
tence level of polluting consumption that drives the results of Proposition
1. The result presented in Proposition 2 is independent of the level of D0.
Proof. Setting D0 = 0 in Equations (8), (9) and (10) yields the desired
result.
4 Conclusion
In this note we demonstrate conceptually that carbon-intensive subsistence
consumption is the key to understanding the distributional effects of a car-
bon tax reform. We confirm that such a reform is regressive if revenues are
recycled by lump-sum transfers that are in proportion to the households’
productivities, and if revenues are recycled via linear income tax cuts. By
contrast, a carbon tax reform can be made progressive by recycling the
revenues as uniform lump-sum transfers. No additional assumptions are re-
quired to obtain our analytical results, which makes the modeling strategy
transparent and our results robust.
Several extensions of our framework are conceivable, but go beyond the
scope of this letter. Examples include non-linear income tax reductions,
price effects and taxing emissions instead of output. We treat these cases in
a numerical study (Klenert et al., 2016). Moreover, long-term consequences
of a carbon tax reform would need to be studied in a model with structural
change so that a decarbonization of the economy is possible.
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